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Abstract
Previous literature on statistical discrimination explained stereotypes based on the existence of
multiple equilibria, in which principals have different self-confirming beliefs about different social
groups (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). However, the literature has not provided an account
of where the principals’ prior beliefs come from. Moreover, the static models dominating the litera-
ture do not offer relevant information about the dynamic paths that lead to each equilibrium. This
paper develops a dynamic version of statistical discrimination in which economic players’ forward-
looking behaviors determine the dynamic paths to each equilibrium. Defining “Group Reputation”
as the objective information shared by principals regarding the average characteristics of agents
belonging to each group, this study identifies groups as advantaged or disadvantaged, based on their
initial reputation states, and provides conditions by which a group can switch from one reputation
state to another. By understanding this dynamic structure of reputation evolution, we examine the
strategy that well-coordinated principals may voluntarily utilize to maximize their profits, helping
the group in the reputation trap to improve its skill investment rate.
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1 Introduction
Previous literature on statistical discrimination explained stereotypes based on the existence of mul-
tiple equilibria, in which principals have different self-confirming beliefs about different social groups
(Arrow, 1973, Coate and Loury, 1993). However, the literature has not provided an account of where
the principals’ prior beliefs come from, nor an account of which particular groups should be expected to
have an advantage when unequal group stereotypes become confirmed in equilibrium (Moro and Nor-
man, 2004, Chaudhuri and Sethi, 2008). Moreover, the static models dominating the literature cannot
be used to understand the dynamic paths that lead to each equilibrium. In this paper, we develop
a dynamic version of statistical discrimination in which economic players’ forward-looking behaviors
determine the dynamic path to each equilibrium. With the paths identified, the self-confirming belief
is explained by the consequence of the historical development of the overall quality of each group.
The developed dynamic model can provide conditions to reach each equilibrium point and to switch
from one equilibrium point to another. Consequently, we can identify groups to be advantaged or
disadvantaged, based on their initial historical positions. By understanding the dynamic mechanism,
we can provide a richer analysis of egalitarian policies than static models can, by reflecting on the
forward-looking decision making of principals and agents.
We start by distinguishing group reputation from individual reputation. Group reputation is de-
fined as the average characteristics of the group members, which is shared by principals. Individual
reputation is defined as the probability that an individual is qualified for a certain task, given his
group identity and his personal records, which is assessed by the principals who hire him. The essen-
tial point is that an individual’s reputation is influenced by the reputation of the group to which he
belongs, when his personal records are insufficient to clarify his qualification for the task. The more
insufficient the records are, the more the principals rely on the average characteristics of the group
in their assignment decision. Therefore, given the same personal records, an individual with a good
group reputation is treated more favorably than one with a bad group reputation.
This implies that an individual’s decision for skill investment to be qualified for a task is affected by
others’ skill investment in the same identity group; each individual makes his investment decision by
considering the expected group reputation in the future, which is determined by other group members’
skill investment now and in the future. If more of them are expected to invest, he has more incentive
to invest in the qualification for the task because the expected payoff will be greater. This externality
of group reputation implies the possibility of collective action to improve or worsen group reputation,
which is simply a self-fulfilling process: if each group member believes that other group members will
invest, the expected payoff is high and it is likely that more members will invest, but if each of them
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doubts that others will invest, the expected payoff is low and it is likely that few will invest.
This work identifies the multiple steady states, as most statistical discrimination models do. Then,
we will check how these dynamic aspects of group reputation help to explain the dynamic paths to
reach each steady state.
For a concrete analysis, we adopted a basic set-up of job assignment models introduced by Coate
and Loury (1993). There are two jobs, task one and task zero, and task one is the more rewarding
and demanding job. Principals determine who will be assigned to task one. Given the bell-shaped
distribution of investment cost among the population, we identify three steady states. The dynamic
system engaged with the externality of group reputation proves that two are saddle points and one is
an unstable source. The dynamic path that leads to each saddle point is easily traced in the phase
diagram. By having two equilibrium paths to two saddle points, high and low reputation steady states,
we define the overlap of the two paths. Within the overlap, either the good or bad reputation steady
state can be reached, which means that if a group shares an optimistic view about the future, the
high reputation state is gradually realized in the future, while the bad reputation state is realized if
the group shares a pessimistic view toward the future. Outside the overlap, the historical position,
an initial reputation level, determines the final reputation state; the group with an initial reputation
above the overlap range converges to the high reputation steady state, while the group with initial
reputation below it converges to the low reputation state.
By using this dynamic structure of group reputation, we explain the persistent racial inequality in
the United States. When the overt discrimination in the past results in a very low reputation of the
black group, the group will improve its reputation over time as the practice of overt discrimination
disappears. However, the reputation of the group may improve only up to the low reputation steady
state and stay persistently there because of the non-existence of a path to the high reputation steady
state. The white group, which is initially better positioned than the black group, is advantaged by
being given the path to the high reputation level.
The high reputation steady state is pareto dominant to the low state, in that both principals
and agents are better off in the high reputation state. Principals may have an incentive to help the
disadvantaged group in the reputation trap to improve its skill investment rate, so that principals
can increase their profits. We distinguish monopolistic principals from competitive principals (Loury
2002). Competitive principals cannot change the status of the disadvantaged group because the size of
each principal is relatively insignificant and one’s actions cannot affect the overall behavior of numerous
agents. However, monopolistic principals, which are defined as a very small number of principals in
the economy or principals well coordinated by a mediator such as government, are able to change
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the structure of the economy and affect the behavior of the disadvantaged group. We investigate two
possible strategies that principals may consider: applying a favorable hiring standard and subsidizing
the training cost. Each may incur some cost to principals. Principals, if they are well coordinated,
may decide which one is to be chosen by comparing the costs and increased profits of the strategies.
This paper was inspired by an insight of Jean Tirole (1996), who examined the persistent cor-
rupt behaviors of group members. He derived the existence of multiple stereotypes from “history
dependence” rather than from self-confirming prior belief, which statistical discrimination literature
had been based on since the seminal work of Arrow (1973). A member’s past behavior is imperfectly
observed by principals. Thus, principals use collective reputation as well as the member’s imperfect
track record in the determination of hiring. Poor collective behavior in the past may make the current
good behavior a low-yield individual investment and thus generates poor collective behavior in the
future. Tirole concludes that a negative stereotype, once developed, can be long lasting: a one-time,
non-recurrent shock due to the behavior of a group can prevent the group from ever returning to a
satisfactory state, even long after the people affected by the original shock have died. Tirole’s game-
theoretical approach, however, ignores the importance of group expectations about the future: over
some range of initial reputation, either a good reputation steady state or a bad reputation steady state
can be a final destination of the group, depending on the shared beliefs among group members about
the future. For example, under some circumstances, even a group with a good reputation may fall to
the bad reputation steady state if pessimism prevails among group members. This coordination issue
is not addressed properly in his work.
We are indebted to Krugman’s insight about the interpretation of two equilibrium paths leading
to two steady states (Krugman 1991). In the seminal paper entitled “History Versus Expectations,”
he argues that, within the overlap, expectation determines the final state, while, outside the overlap,
the final state is determined by history, the initial position. Being inspired by Krugman’s work, Kim
(2008) develops a dynamic model of social mobility with network externality, in which Krugman’s
history versus expectation structure is combined with the overlapping generation model of Bowles,
Loury and Sethi (2007). This paper adopts a dynamic framework similar to that of Kim (2008), in
which overlap is generated by the forward-looking behaviors of agents in an overlapping generational
model. In this line of research, Levin (2009) also develops a stochastic version of Tirole’s (1996)
collective reputation model and illustrates how history can be decisive in structuring expectations and
influencing behavior at any point in time.
This paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 describes the motivation of this
research. Section 3 develops the dynamic reputation model. Section 4 shows the applications of
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the model. Section 5 describes the strategies of monopolistic principals. Section 6 presents further
discussions. Section 7 contains the conclusion.
2 Motivation
In this section, we identify the multiple steady states in a job assignment model introduced by Coate
and Loury (1993) and argue the limitation of static statistical discrimination models.
Imagine a large number of identical employers and a larger population of workers. Each employer
will be randomly matched with many workers from this population. Employers assign each worker
to one of two jobs, called task one and task zero. Task one is a more demanding and rewarding
assignment: workers get the gross benefit w if assigned to task one. All workers prefer to be assigned
to task one, whether or not they are qualified for the task. Employers gain a net return Xq if they
assign a qualified worker to task one and suffer a net loss Xu if they assign an unqualified worker
to task one. Define ρ ≡ Xq/Xu to be the ratio of net gain to loss. A worker’s gross returns and an
employer’s net return from an assignment to task zero are normalized to zero.
Employers are unable to observe whether a worker is qualified for task one. Employers observe
each worker’s group identity and a noisy signal θ ∈ [0, θ¯]. The distribution of θ depends on whether
or not a worker is qualified. The signal might be the result of a test, an interview, or some form of
on-the-job monitoring. The signal is distributed for a qualified worker as fq(θ), and for an unqualified
worker as fu(θ), as displayed in Panel A of Figure 1. Define ψ(θ) ≡ fu(θ)/fq(θ), to be the likelihood
ratio at θ. We assume that ψ(θ) is nonincreasing on [0, θ¯], which implies Fq(θ) ≤ Fu(θ) for all θ.
Employers’ assignment policies will be characterized by the choice of hiring standard s for each
group, such that only those workers with a signal observed to exceed the standard are assigned to
the more demanding task. Given the proportion of qualified workers Πi among group i population,
employers assign a group i worker who “emits” signal θ to task one position if the expected payoff,
Xq · Prob[qualified|θ] − Xu · Prob[unqualified|θ], is nonnegative. Using Bayes’ rule, the posterior
probability that he is qualified is Π
ifq(θ)
Πifq(θ)+(1−Πi)fu(θ) . Therefore, the hiring standard s is a function of
Πi:
s∗(Πi) ≡ min
{
θ ∈ [0, θ¯]|ψ(θ) ≤ ρΠ
i
1−Πi
}
, (1)
where s∗(Πi) is a nonincreasing function of Πi. Note that s∗(0) ≤ θ¯ and s∗(1) = 0.
We now turn to a worker’s investment decision. Workers are qualified only if they made some
ex ante investment. The cost of becoming qualified varies among workers and is distributed as CDF
G(c) in (0,∞). We assume that G(0) > 0 and G(W ) < 1, which implies that there is a fraction of
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the workers who will invest for very tiny expected benefits of investment, and there is a fraction of
workers who will not invest even for the highest possible benefits W . If the assignment standard is s,
the probability of assignment is 1−Fq(s) when qualified, and 1−Fu(s) when unqualified. A worker with
investment cost c invests if and only if the net return of being qualified is greater or equal to the net
return of being unqualified; invest if and only if W [Fu(s)−Fq(s)] ≥ c. Thus, among all workers facing
the standard s, the proportion that becomes qualified is G(β˜(s)), denoting β˜(s) ≡ W [Fu(s)− Fq(s)].
Note that G(β˜(0)) = G(β˜(θ¯)) > 0.
Figure 1 describes the multiple steady states given two noisy signals fu(θ) and fq(θ). Checking
the boundary conditions of s∗(Πi) and G(β˜(s)), it is obvious that at least one steady state exists. It
is most likely that there are three steady states if the number of steady states is not unique.
Proposition 1 (Multiple Steady States). Assume that ψ(θ) is continuous and strictly decreasing
on [0, θ¯], and G(c) is continuous and satisfies G(0) > 0. If there are s1 and s2 in [0, θ¯] for which
G(β˜(s1)) > ψ(s
1)
ρ+ψ(s1)
, G(β˜(s2)) < ψ(s
2)
ρ+ψ(s2)
and s1 < s2, then at least three steady states exist.
For the same parameters and G(c) function, if signal functions fu and fq are more informative,
that is, signals are less noisy, there tends to be a unique steady state. Note that the steady states are
identified in (Π, β˜) domain as well, which is mainly used in later parts of the paper. In this domain
displayed in Panel B of Figure 1, the dotted curve represents the expected benefits of investment that
is determined by employers’ hiring standard s∗(Πi). The S -shaped solid curve indicates the proportion
of workers who will invest given the benefits of investment β˜.
In the previous statistical discrimination literature, those steady states are explained by self-
confirming prior beliefs: employers’ beliefs about the likelihood of a group’s members being qualified
will determine the hiring standard for the group, and the standard will determine the fraction of each
group who become qualified. When workers from one group (B’s, say) are believed less likely to be
qualified, the belief for group B will be self conformed at the lower steady state, while workers from
the other group (W’s, say) are believed more likely to be qualified, the belief for group W will be self
confirmed at the higher steady state, as displayed in Figure 1. This is a situation of discriminatory
behavior by employers and persistent skill disparity between two groups.
However, the static model does not provide an explanation for where the employers’ prior beliefs
come from, and why employers start to have different beliefs about different social groups. Also, it
cannot explain the case that the initial employers’ belief is not at one of those steady states. The
belief will be updated over time and may converge to one of the steady states. The model does not
provide the evolution path from an initial state that is not a steady state. Also, one group stuck in one
steady state may move to another steady state under some circumstances. The model cannot analyze
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the condition that enables the switch from one steady state to another. Above all, it ignores the
forward looking behavior of group members. In the static model, it assumes that workers react to the
employers’ prior belief without accounting for expected payoff in the future. This myopic assumption
limits the dynamic analysis of the model. In sum, the static model does not provide any explanation
except the possible scenario on each steady state. Nothing can be discussed for the states other than
the steady states. For these reasons, its analysis on the policy implication is restricted around the
steady states and limited by employers’ prior beliefs, for which the model does not provide an account.
In this paper, we try to overcome the shortcomings of the static models of statistical discrimination by
introducing the fully dynamic framework with the economic agents’ forward looking decision making
reflected.
3 Dynamic Reputation Model
In this section, we develop a dynamic version of statistical discrimination with an insight that an
individual’s reputation is influenced by the collective reputation of the group to which he belongs.
3.1 Group Reputation and Individual Reputation
Instead of relying on the employers’ prior beliefs, we propose that employers use the objective infor-
mation about the overall quality of each group in their decision to set up the hiring standard applied
to a group. The overall quality is the proportion of qualified workers Πi in the market in the given job
assignment model. The objective information for the overall quality is directly computed from the fol-
lowing formula: F i(θ) = ΠiFq(θ)+(1−Πi)Fu(θ). F i(θ) represents the fraction of group i workers who
emit a signal below θ, which is easily observed by employers who are matched with a large population
of each group. Assuming that Fq(θ) and Fu(θ) are common knowledge, each employer can obtain the
information about the proportion of qualified workers among group i members in the market using
the aggregate information F i(θ),
Πi =
Fu(θ)− F i(θ)
Fu(θ)− Fq(θ) , ∀θ. (2)
Let us call the quality of group Πi, which is shared among employers, group reputation. Facing a
job candidate of group identity i and signal θ, an employer will try to calculate the probability that
he is qualified, so that he can make a decision of whether to assign him to task one. Let us call it an
individual reputation of group identity i and signal θ, and denote it by R(i, θ):
R(i, θ) =
Πifq(θ)
Πifq(θ) + (1−Πi)fu(θ) . (3)
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Direct observation is that an individual reputation R(i, θ) is an increasing function of group reputa-
tion Πi: ∂R(i,θ)
∂Πi
> 0. The higher the expected individual reputation, the more incentive each individual
has to make skill investment. Consequently, an individual’s skill investment is affected by the expected
group reputation in the future. Each individual will consider others’ investment decisions now and in
the future, in his current decision of skill investment. This externality of group reputation contains
the possibility of collective action to build up better group reputation together, or to drag down the
good group reputation to the worse reputation state. In the following section, we will examine these
dynamic aspects of group reputation, and will try to find the answers to the questions raised for the
static models in the earlier section.
3.2 Dynamic System
In the dynamic model, we assume that each worker makes skill investment at the early stage of his life
and then works for the rest of his life. He is subject to a “Poisson death process” with parameter λ
(Kim 2008, Tirole 1996): in a unit period, each individual faces a probability of death λ. We assume
that the total population of each group is constant. Therefore, in a unit period, a fraction λ of workers
are replaced by newborn agents. Suppose that each individual discounts future payoffs at the rate
δ, and employers discount future payoffs at the rate r. Suppose that a worker is randomly matched
with employers every period, which implies that he will go through the regular screening process every
period. The condition for the screening process is identical for each period. In the appendix, we will
loosen this assumption by introducing a market learning process, in which the true characteristic of
each worker is more likely to be revealed as he spends more time in the market.
The expected extra benefit to being qualified at time τ (βτ ) is ω[Fu(sτ )− Fq(sτ )], where ω is the
wage rate at task 1. Employers gain a net return xq from the correct assignment and incur a net loss
xu from incorrect assignment. Note that ω, xq and xu in the dynamic model with the infinite time
horizon is analogous to W , Xq and Xu in the one-time static model in the section on motivation.
For consistency’s sake, we suggest that they satisfy the followings: W ≡ ∫∞t ωe−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ , Xq ≡∫∞
t xqe
−r(τ−t)dτ and Xu ≡
∫∞
t xue
−r(τ−t)dτ . Note that ρ ≡ Xq/Xu = xq/xu. The expected lifetime
benefits of investment for workers born at time t is
∫∞
t βτe
−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ. For convenience, we denote
as Vt the “normalized” lifetime benefits of investment:
Vt = (δ + λ)
∫ ∞
t
βτe
−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ. (4)
Taking a derivative with respect to t, we can describe how Vt evolves over time,
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V˙t = (δ + λ)[Vt − βt]. (5)
Let φt denote the fraction of workers born at time t who invest and become qualified. Since λ of the
total population is replaced with newborn agents in a unit period, Πt evolves in short time interval
∆t in the following way,
Πt+∆t ≈ λ∆t ·
(
φt + φt+∆t
2
)
+ (1− λ∆t) ·Πt. (6)
By the rearrangement of this equation, we have
∆Πt
∆t
≡ Πt+∆t −Πt
∆t
≈ λ
[
φt + φt+∆t
2
−Πt
]
.
Taking ∆t→ 0, we can express how Πt evolves over time,
Π˙t = λ[φt −Πt]. (7)
Note that there is a direct way to achieve the same result. We can define Πt as Πt ≡
∫ t
−∞ λφτe
−λ(t−τ)dτ ,
and taking a derivative with respect to t, we have Π˙t = λ[φt −Πt]. Thus, we have a dynamic system.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic System). The dynamic system with a flow variable Πt and a jumping variable
Vt is summarized by the following two-variable differential equations:
Π˙t = λ[φt −Πt]
V˙t = (δ + λ)[Vt − βt], (8)
with demarcation loci of
Π˙t = 0 Locus : Πt = φt
V˙t = 0 Locus : Vt = βt. (9)
We can interpret the theorem as follows: the difference between the investment rate of the newborn
cohort and the overall qualification ratio of group i workers determines the speed of group reputation
change. The change in accrued benefits of investment at time t is determined by the difference between
the accrued benefits of investment at time t and the time t level of the benefits of being qualified.
Note that there is no change in group reputation if the fraction of the newborn cohorts who invest
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is exactly the same as the level of group reputation, and there is no change in lifetime benefits of
investment if the current benefits of being qualified is exactly equal to the level of lifetime benefits of
investment.
3.3 Simple Reputation Model
In order to understand the dynamic system correctly, we will start with the simplest functional forms
that do not hurt the essential structure of the economy: fu(θ) is uniformly distributed in [0, θu] and
fq(θ) is uniformly distributed in [θq, θ¯], where θq < θu. The population of each group is constituted
of three types of agents: Πl fraction of workers whose investment cost is very small and close to zero,
1−Πh fraction of workers whose investment cost is very high and beyond the highest possible benefit
from investment ωδ+λ , and Πh−Πl fraction of workers whose investment cost is intermediate and fixed
as cm. Then, cost distribution G(c) is Πl for c ∈ (², cm), and Πh for c ∈ (cm, ω/(δ + λ)).
In this case, employers will set the hiring standard as either θu or θq. If the signal is below θq, the
worker must be unqualified, and, if the signal is above θu, the worker must be qualified. If the signal is
between θq and θu, the signal is unable to tell the true characteristic of the worker. Let us denote the
probability that, if a worker does invest, his test outcome proves that he is qualified by Pq(= θ¯−θuθ¯−θq )
and the probability that, if a worker does not invest, his test outcome proves that he is unqualified by
Pu(=
θq
θu
).
Assumption 1 (Imperfect Information). A qualified worker’s signal is less informative, compared to
an unqualified worker’s signal. This is, the payoff uncertainty is greater for qualified workers compared
to for unqualified workers: Pq < Pu, and equivalently, θq + θu > θ¯.
From this assumption, we propose that non-qualification of workers is easily detected by employers.
However, qualification of workers is relatively hard for employers to confirm. This is an essential part
of the imperfect information in the labor market. If the investment of workers can be easily confirmed,
workers do not have to worry that their chance to be assigned to a good job is affected by their group’s
reputation.
Employers must make a decision on whether or not to give the benefit of the doubt (BOD) if the
signal is unclear. If they give BOD to a group, the hiring standard for the group is θu, but, if not,
the hiring standard for the group is θq. Employers’ decision to give BOD is determined by the sign of
expected payoff, xq · Prob[qualified|θ] − xu · Prob[unqualified|θ], for θq < θ < θu. Using Bayes’ rule,
the posterior probability that the worker with group identity i and an unclear signal (θq < θ < θu)
is qualified is Π
i(1−Pq)
Πi(1−Pq)+(1−Πi)(1−Pu) . Thus, we can find the threshold level Π
∗, above which employers
give BOD and below which they do not give BOD, where Π∗ ≡ 1−Puρ(1−Pq)+1−Pu with ρ =
xq
xu
. Note that
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the threshold level can be obtained using equation (1) as well: Π∗ ≡ θ¯−θq
ρθu+θ¯−θq , which is identical to
the above.
If agents with unclear signals are assigned to task one, that is, BOD is given, the extra benefit
βτ to being qualified is ωPu, because the expected benefit to being qualified is ω and that to being
unqualified is ω(1− Pu), or because βτ = ω[Fu(θq)− Fq(θq)] = ωθq/θu. If agents with unclear signals
are not assigned, that is, BOD is not given, the extra benefit to being qualified is ωPq, because the
expected benefit to being qualified is ωPq and that to being unqualified is zero, or because βτ =
ω[Fu(θu) − Fq(θu)] = ω(θ¯ − θu)/(θ¯ − θq). Therefore, at time t the extra benefit to being qualified is
summarized by
βt(Πt) =

ωPu for Πt ∈ [Π∗, 1]
ωPq for Πt ∈ [0,Π∗).
(10)
Given the cost distribution G(c) among the newborn cohort, the fraction of newborn agents who
become qualified is
φt = G
(
Vt
δ + λ
)
. (11)
Using βt and φt, we can draw demarcation loci as displayed in Panel A of Figure 2. In the left (right)
side of βt locus, the movement of V is westward (eastward). Above (below) φt locus, the movement
of Π is southward (northward). As far as Π∗ is between Πh and Πl and (δ+ λ)cm is between ωPq and
ωPu, there will be multiple steady states, which are denoted as Qh(ωPu,Πh), Qm((δ + λ)cm,Π∗) and
Ql(ωPq,Πl) in the panel. Note that the middle one Qm((δ+λ)cm,Π∗) is a “conditional” steady state:
that is, it becomes steady state only when φt = Π∗ for Vt = (δ+λ)cm and βt = (δ+λ)cm for Πt = Π∗.1
In the following sections, we will assume that Π∗ ∈ (Πl,Πh) and (δ + λ)cm ∈ (ωPq, ωPu). Otherwise,
there is a unique steady state and nothing to be discussed because there will be no reputation disparity
between social groups. In Panel B of Figure 2, we display the equilibrium path that leads to each
steady state, Qh and Ql. In the next sections, we will provide concrete explanations about this
dynamic structure and the economic meanings of equilibrium paths.
3.3.1 Properties of Simple Reputation Model
In order to have a deeper analysis of the dynamic model, we will focus on the gray box in Panel
B of Figure 2, within which meaningful dynamic structure is constructed, by the adjustment of the
scaling of Vt. Let us define vt as a linear transformation of Vt such as Vt = ωPq + ω(Pu − Pq)vt.
1The first condition implies that the fraction of the newborn worker who invest is Π∗ so that there is no change
in the overall group reputation. The second condition implies the principals’ mixed strategy assigns only a fraction
v∗(= (δ+λ)cm−wPq
w(Pu−Pq) ) of workers who emit an unclear signal to the task 1 position. Note that the latter is not consistent
with the hiring standard rule defined in equation (1), in which s∗(Π∗) = θq and βt = ωPu.
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Then, as vt ranges over [0, 1], Vt ranges over [ωPq, ωPu], which is the entire range of the gray box.
Let us denote by ξt the indicator of giving BOD: ξt = 1 if Πt > Π∗ and ξt = 0 if Πt < Π∗. Since
βt = wPu · ξt + wPq · (1− ξt), applying to equation (4), we have
Vt = ωPq + ω(Pu − Pq)(δ + λ)
∫ ∞
t
ξτe
−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ
Thus, vt simply indicates the normalized lifetime BOD:
vt = (δ + λ)
∫ ∞
t
ξτe
−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ.
The dynamic system in this modified model with a flow variable Πt and a jumping variable vt is
Π˙t = λ[φt −Πt]
v˙t = (δ + λ)[vt − ξt],
with demarcation loci of
Π˙t = 0 Locus : Πt = φt
v˙t = 0 Locus : vt = ξt.
The critical level of Vt, (δ + λ)cm, is denoted in this (vt,Πt) domain as
v∗ ≡ (δ + λ)cm − wPq
w(Pu − Pq) .
The differential equations in each region are divided by two lines vt = v∗ and Πt = Π∗ and are
displayed in Figure 3, named by regions I, II, III and IV, going counterclockwise. The corresponding
steady states are Qh(1,Πh), Qm(v∗,Π∗) and Ql(0,Πl). In regions I and II, principals give BOD, which
they do not give BOD in other regions. In regions II and III, only a fraction Πl of the newborn cohort
invests, while a fraction Πh of the newborn cohort invest in regions I and IV.
Definition 1 (Economically Stable State). A state (V ′,Π′) is an economically stable state if there
exists an equilibrium path that converges to the state for any Π in the neighborhood of Π′.
This means that a state is defined as “economically stable” if when nearby to the state, economic
agents can find a reasonable equilibrium path that converges to it, even though the state itself is
mathematically unstable: it is a saddle point in general (Kim 2008).
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Lemma 1 (Spiraling Out Paths). In the simple reputation model, the state Qm(v∗,Π∗) is unstable,
and the phase paths around it spiral out.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
Lemma 2 (Curvature of Paths). In the simple reputation model, the equilibrium paths are concave
on the right hand side of the v = v∗ line, and convex on the left hand side of the v = v∗ line.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
Using direction arrows in Panel A of Figure 2, we can easily identify the equilibrium paths to the
steady states Qh and Ql, which are vertical straight lines nearby the states. Lemma 1 tells us that
the paths spiral out around the state Qm.
Proposition 2 (Dual Economically Stable States). In the simple reputation model, there exist two
economically stable states, Qh(1,Πh) and Ql(0,Πl).
Because there are two economically stable states, group members with group reputation Π0 ∈ [0, 1]
may rationally conjecture that the final state should be either the high reputation state Qh or the
reputation state Ql. Let us suppose that group members can make a consensus about the future state
all together. Suppose that, once the consensus is built up, it can be passed to the next generations.
For example, group members with its group reputation around Π∗ may hold an optimistic view that
the final state would be Qh instead of Ql. Then, by rational reasoning, they will find the optimal
path that leads to the high reputation state. Based on the optimal path and the expected high payoff,
a newborn cohort will make an investment decision. Generations following will make an investment
decision based on the same optimal path leading to Qh, as far as the optimistic consensus is passed
to the next generations. By this self-confirming process, the group will gradually approach the state
Qh, improving its collective reputation. However, if the group shares the pessimistic view toward the
future and the pessimistic consensus is passed to the next generations, the reputation of the group
may gradually fall down to the low reputation level Πl.
Since either Qh or Ql is realized in the future for any given initial reputation level, it is worth
checking which is superior to the other.
Proposition 3 (Pareto Dominance). In the simple reputation model, Qh is strictly Pareto dominant
to Ql; all economic agents, including employers and workers with different investment costs, are better
off when the group state (vt,Πt) stays at Qh than at Ql.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
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Thus, the high reputation state Qh is socially more desirable than the low reputation state Ql.
It is noteworthy that all types are better off at the high reputation state; even high investment cost
individuals who will never invest for the job qualification are better off in this state. One interesting
point is that employers are better off when group reputation is good than bad.
3.3.2 Interpretation of Simple Reputation Model
Denote the lower boundary of the equilibrium path to Qh as pio, and the upper boundary of the
equilibrium path to Ql as pip. Denote the initial reputation level of group i as Πi0. At any initial
reputation level Πi0 ∈ [pio, 1], group i can converge to the high reputation state Πh by sharing an
optimistic view of the future among group members. At any initial reputation level Πi0 ∈ [0, pip],
group i can converge to the low reputation state Πl by sharing a pessimistic view of the future among
group members. Thus, we call the equilibrium path to Qh the “optimistic path”, and the equilibrium
path to Ql the “pessimistic path”.
In the given simple reputation model, the optimistic path passes through (1,Π∗). The overall
shape of the optimistic path is determined by how much the concave curve in region IV is bent. If
the path passes through between Πl and Π∗ at v = v∗, the path changes its direction entering region
III, and pio becomes greater than Πl. Otherwise, the path maintains its direction entering the region
and pio becomes zero. The pessimistic path passes through (0,Π∗). The overall shape of the path is
determined by how much the convex curve in region II is bent. If the path passes through between
Πh and Π∗ at v = v∗, the path changes its direction entering region I, and pip becomes smaller than
Πh. Otherwise, the paths maintains its direction entering the region and pip becomes one.
Definition 2 (Overlap). The range of group reputation level [pio, pip] is called “overlap”; if the initial
group reputation Πi0 is within the overlap, group i can converge either to the high reputation state Qh
by sharing an optimistic view among group members, or to the low reputation state Ql by sharing a
pessimistic view among them.
Note that, with an initial reputation level Πi0 ∈ (pip, 1], group i “must” converge to the high
reputation state Qh because the optimistic path is the only reasonable path. With an initial reputation
level Πi0 ∈ [0, pio), group i “must” converge to the low reputation state Ql because the pessimistic path
is the only reasonable path. Therefore, those ranges, (pip, 1] and [0, pio), are respectively called a
deterministic range for Qh and a deterministic range for Ql.
Definition 3 (Reputation Trap). The low reputation state Ql is called a“reputation trap” if Πl belongs
to the deterministic range for Ql, [0, pio), namely below the overlap [pio, pip].
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Thus, if a group is in the reputation trap, there is no way to recover its reputation without a
change in the dynamic structure.
Lemma 3 (Separation). In the simple reputation model, if pio > Πl and pip < Πh, that is, the two
economically stable states Qh and Ql are “separate” from each other; a group in either state cannot
move to the other state by changing its expectations:
δ
λ
>
max{− ln(1− v∗),− ln(v∗)} − 1
ln(Πh −Πl)− ln(Π∗ −Πl) .
Proof. Using pio and pip listed below, the condition is directly obtained. ¥
In order to analyze the properties of overlap, let us suppose δ is big enough that two economically
stable states are “separate” from each other. Then, the lower boundary of the optimistic path and
the upper boundary of the pessimistic path are
pio = Πh + (Π∗ −Πh)v∗−
λ
δ+λ ,
pip = Πl + (Π∗ −Πl)(1− v∗)−
λ
δ+λ .
The size of overlap L(≡ pip − pio) is directly computed as
L = Πl −Πh + (Π∗ −Πl)(1− v∗)−
λ
δ+λ + (Πh −Π∗)v∗−
λ
δ+λ . (12)
Therefore, we have the following properties of overlap size: ∂L∂δ < 0 and
∂L
∂λ > 0. This implies that,
the more weight that workers place on future payoffs (lower δ), or the faster generations are replaced
by newborns (higher λ), the size of the overlap tends to be bigger (bigger L), which means that the
expectation toward the future plays a greater role in the determination of the final economic outcome.
Also, the overlap shifts up with higher level of investment cost: ∂pi
p
∂cm
> 0 and ∂pi
o
∂cm
> 0. This implies
that the higher (lower) the investment cost, the more likely that a group converges to the low (high)
reputation state Ql (Qh).
Proposition 4 (Properties of Overlap). Under Lemma 3, the size of overlap tends to be bigger with
the smaller δ, and the larger λ: expectation toward the future tends to plays a bigger role if workers
discount the future payoff less, and if generations are replaced faster. The range of overlap tends to
shift up with bigger cm: social groups are more likely to converge to the low reputation state Ql when
investment cost is bigger.
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3.4 Generalization of Simple Reputation Model
Now let us come back to the static statistical reputation model of Coate and Loury (1993) introduced
in the section on motivation. Given the noisy signals fu(θ) and fq(θ) displayed in Panel A of Figure 1,
we have identified three steady states in Panel B of the same figure. However, in the static model, we
could not answer questions about the dynamic paths that lead to those steady states, and conditions
under which a group can switch from one state to the other. Using the developed dynamic model, we
will answer those questions.
As Theorem 1 says, the demarcation loci are φt and βt. φt is G
(
Vt
δ+λ
)
, as noted in equation (11).
βt is ω[Fu(st) − Fq(st)] and st is a function of Πt, as noted in equation (1). Those two demarcation
loci are displayed in Panel A of Figure 5 with direction arrows. In Panel B of the same Figure, we
can identify three steady states out of the demarcation loci. Note that those steady states are exactly
the same as the steady states identified in the static model displayed in Figure 1.2 Let us denote the
steady states as Qh(Vh,Πh), Qm(Vm,Πm) and Ql(Vl,Πl).
Lemma 4 (Saddle Points). Among three steady states, Qh, Qm and Ql, Qh and Ql are saddle points
and Qm is a source.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
We might wonder whether the equilibrium paths around Qm spiral out or not. The following
lemma shows that it depends on the relative size of δ and λ.
Lemma 5 (Spiraling Out). There exists a critical level of (δ/λ)∗ below which equilibrium paths spiral
out in the neighborhood of Qm, where (δ/λ)∗ satisfies
(
1 + λδ
)
λ
δ =
1
4(φ′tβ′t−1)
∣∣
(Vm,Πm)
.
Proof. See the proof in the appendix. ¥
This implies that the less workers discount the future payoffs, the more likely that the equilibrium
paths will spiral out around Qm.
Theorem 2 (Dual Economically Stable States). Under Lemma 4, there exist two economically stable
states, and equilibrium paths to those states overlap for a certain range of Π.
Proof. Two states are saddles points, and consequently economically stable states. Using the phase
diagram in Figure 5, the existence of overlap is directly proven. ¥
2Compared to the β˜(≡ w[Fu(s) − Fq(s)]) in Panel B of Figure 1, βt is scaled down as much as (δ + λ) because
W ≡ ∫∞
t
ωe−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ . Compared to G(β˜) in the same figure, φt is scaled down as much as (δ+λ) in the horizontal
direction. Therefore, two demarcation loci are identical to the “scaled down” reaction curves in the static model.
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In Panel A of Figure 6, we display the optimistic path to Qh and the pessimistic path to Ql. In
Panel B of the same figure, we identify the overlap of the two equilibrium paths and the reputation
trap. Note Ql becomes a reputation trap when Πl is located below the overlap, as discussed earlier.
Once a group is in the trap, the group cannot move out of the trap unless there is a structural
change in the labor market. If the overlap is between Πl and Πh, then a group in either economically
stable state cannot move to the other state even through the collective action by the group. Also,
if an economically stable state is covered by the overlap, a group in the state can move to the other
economically stable state.
4 Applications: US Racial Disparity
In this section, we try to explain a real world issue using the developed dynamic reputation model.
Over the Jim Crow period and until the civil right movement in the 1960s, African-Americans were
discriminated against in an overt manner in the US labor market. This discrimination decreased
significantly over the last decades. However, we still observe the persistent black-white disparity of
skill achievement. The advocates of the black group insist that they are discriminated against con-
tinuously. The dynamic reputation model explains one possible origin of the persistent disparity, and
the continuing “statistical” discrimination practice in the market, which uses the “group reputation”
under the imperfect information about the job candidates.
When overt discrimination in the American history results in a very low ratio of qualified workers
among blacks (very low ΠB0 ), the quality of the group will improve over time after the disappearance of
taste-based discriminatory practice. However, as Figure 7 displays, the group reputation or the quality
of the group may improve only up to the low reputation state Πl, which is a reputation trap under
some circumstances. If the group is in the trap and is continuously disadvantaged by the market’s
“statistical” discriminatory practice, the group may stay permanently in the state. The collective
action of building up the better group reputation cannot work in this situation, because rational
agents know that other group members will not invest for the change of group reputation when their
skill achievement is not paid back enough in the future due to the low group reputation.
Some might wonder why the white group is advantaged with the group’s higher reputation over
the same time frame. The initial group reputation of the white group should be much higher than that
of the black group. As Figure 7 displays, if the initial group reputation is higher and belongs to the
overlap, the group can take the optimistic path that leads to the high reputation state Qh by sharing
the optimistic view toward the future together. They will invest more than the black group in skill
achievement, because the expected benefits of investment are greater due to the market’s favor for the
17
higher group reputation. The white group is advantaged with the market’s “statistical” discriminatory
practice, while the black group is disadvantaged with that.
Note that we have assumed that the underlying characteristics of the two groups are identical.
Thus, the disparity between groups originates solely from the reputation role embedded in the market
structure. One important implication of the dynamic model is that the reputation gap between two
groups can even grow over time by the agglomeration effects of collective reputation. This should be
an absurd argument to the people who believe that the elimination of market discrimination of taste
shrinks group disparity. The dynamic model claims that it does not need to be true all the time:
depending on the initial reputation levels of groups, the gap between two groups can grow or shrink
over time.
5 Monopolistic Principals
In Proposition 3, we have shown that Qh is pareto dominant to Ql in the simple reputation model:
employers can make bigger profits when a social group is at the high reputation state Qh than at
the low reputation state Ql.3 Suppose a group B is at the reputation trap Ql, as described in Figure
4. Since employers prefer the group’s staying at Qh to its staying at Ql, they might help the group
to move out of the trap and improve the group’s qualification ratio. However, this never happens
in the competitive situation, which is defined as the market condition in which there are numerous
employers and the size of each employer is relatively insignificant. In this situation, one’s action does
not affect the overall behavior of group members. Each employer just accepts the market structure,
and determines whether to give BOD based on the group reputation of B.
Now suppose that they are in the monopolistic situation, which is the market condition in which
there are a small number of employers, or employers are well coordinated by a mediator (eg. govern-
ment). Let us call employers in the monopolistic situation “monopolistic principals”, as defined in
Loury (2002). Monopolistic principals can change the market structure and affect the behavior of the
group in the reputation trap. When the group is stuck in the reputation trap, the principals make
profits as much as
YQl =
∫ ∞
t0
PqΠlxq · e−r(τ−t0)dτ = PqΠlxq
r
.
If their action can make the expected profit greater than YQl , they will take the action and help the
group to move out of the trap. In this section, we will examine the two strategies that they can take:
adjustment of reputation threshold (favorable treatment) and subsidy of training cost.
3Compare employers’ profits for a group at Qh and those at Ql for a unit period: Πhxq − (1 − Πh)(1 − Pu)xu >
ΠlPqxq, given Πl < Π
∗ < Πh.
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Note that the farsightedness of principals and the credibility of their actions are required for the
effective implementation of each strategy. If principals are myopic to anticipate the far future, they
will not be able to implement the long-term policy that gradually improves the qualification ratio of
group B workers. Also, if principals’ “promise” to continue the actions is not considered credible,
group B members may not change the conjecture about the expected benefits of investment, so that
their skill investment rate will not be improved. Finally, we assume that the group in the reputation
trap will move to the high reputation state Qh as soon as the optimistic path to the state is available
to the group, which means that the group members await the chance to recover the reputation.
First, monopolistic principals have an incentive to lower the reputation threshold if the policy can
increase profits by helping the disadvantaged group to move out of the reputation trap. In order to
help the group to move toward the high reputation state Qh, the reputation threshold for BOD needs
to be lowered from Π∗ to Π∗′, where Π∗′ = Πh − (Πh −Πl)v∗
λ
δ+λ , as displayed in Panel A of Figure 8.
The state of group B will move along the following points in the panel as the group members share
the optimistic view toward the future: Ql →jump a → b → c → Qh. Principals may suffer in the
interval (b, c) by placing agents with unclear signals on task one, because the expected payoff of the
assignment is negative with Πt < Π∗. Let us call the corresponding reputation level [Π∗′,Π∗] loss area.
If they take this action, the total profits accrued over time will be
Y (Π∗′) =
∫ tb
t0
PqΠτxq · e−r(τ−t0)dτ +
∫ ∞
tb
[Πτxq − (1− Pu)(1−Πτ )xu] · e−r(τ−t0)dτ, (13)
where tb = − ln v∗δ+λ +t0 and Πτ = Πh−(Πh−Πl) ·e−λ(τ−t0). Therefore, principals will take the threshold
adjustment strategy when Y (Π∗′) ≥ YQl .
Second, monopolistic principals have an incentive to support the training cost of group B members
if the policy can increase profits by helping the group move out of the trap. If the training cost is
subsidized enough by principals, the optimistic path can be available to the group in the trap, as
displayed in Panel B of Figure 8. Then, the state of group B will move along the following points
in the panel as the group members share the optimistic view toward the future: Ql →jump a → b →
c→ Qh. The training cost for the group should be lowered enough so that v∗′ =
(
Πh−Π∗
Πh−Πl
) δ+λ
λ
. Since
v∗ = (δ+λ)cm−wPuw(Pu−Pq) , the required size of subsidy (S
′
) is
S
′
(≡ cm − c′m) =
(v∗ − v∗′)w(Pu − Pq)
δ + λ
, with v∗′ =
(
Πh −Π∗
Πh −Πl
) δ+λ
λ
.
The training subsidy should be implemented for the interval (a, b). Assuming the size of subsidy is
constant as the group state moves from the point a to b, the total cost that the principals incur will
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be
TC(v∗′) =
∫ tb
t0
S′λ · e−r(τ−t0)dτ = S′λ
[
1− e−r(tb−t0)
r
]
,
where tb = ln v
∗
δ+λ +
1
λ · ln Πh−ΠlΠh−Π∗ + t0. The total revenue that the principals benefit from this strategy is
Y (v∗′) =
∫ tc
t0
PqΠτxq · e−r(τ−t0)dτ +
∫ ∞
tc
[Πτxq − (1− Pu)(1−Πτ )xu] · e−r(τ−t0)dτ, (14)
where tc = 1λ · ln Πh−ΠlΠh−Π∗ + t0 and Πτ = Πh − (Πh − Πl) · e−λ(τ−t0). Therefore, principals will take the
training subsidy strategy when Y (v∗′)− TC(v∗′) ≥ YQl .
Proposition 5. In the simple reputation model, well-coordinated monopolistic principals have an
incentive to lower the reputation threshold for BOD of group B from Π∗ to Π∗′ if and only if Y (Π∗′) ≥
YQl, and to subsidize the training cost of group B members as much as S
′ if and only if Y (v∗′) −
TC(v∗′) ≥ YQl.
6 Further Discussion
Note that so far we have not discussed fully the spiraling out equilibrium paths. As denoted in Panel
A of Figure 6, there often exist multiple points of lifetime benefits of investment Vt that are available
to a group for a given level of initial group reputation. In the first graph, the group with a certain level
of initial reputation may choose either point a or point b (or others if available) on the optimistic path
to the high reputation state Qh. What would make the difference between choosing a as an expected
Vt or choosing b? The answer is related to the expectation about the length of time to arrive at Qh.
Choosing point b means that the group believes that the high reputation level Πh will be realized as
soon as it can. This is a case of strong optimism. Choosing point a means that the group believes that
the level Πh may take longer to come. If they believe in that way, the benefits of investment would be
lowered and less of newborn cohorts will have an incentive to invest, causing the group reputation level
to drop for a while, even when they have an optimistic view that the group will arrive at Qh in the long
run. Therefore, this is a case of weaker optimism. In principal, the weaker the optimism that a group
possesses, the more time it may take to arrive at Qh and the more likely that the group reputation
fluctuates over time. In the same way, we can interpret the cases for group pessimism. The point c
indicates the case of strong pessimism that the miserable future Ql may come very soon. With this
view, the expected benefits of investment would be very low and, consequently, a smaller percentage
of the newborn cohort may invest, leading to the decline of the reputation. However, suppose that
they believe that the state Ql may arrive someday, but it may take much longer to come. If then, we
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may observe the increase of group reputation for a while until it starts to decline. Point d represents
this case, namely weaker pessimism.
In the developed reputation model, we have simplified the labor market by the assumption that
each worker is randomly assigned to an employer every period and each of them gets through the
regular screening process repeatedly. In this assumption, the true characteristic of each worker is
never revealed in the market, no matter how long he spends in the workplace. In order to correct
this point, we will add an additional assumption about the market learning process in which, the
more time a worker spends in the workplace, the more likely the market learns his true characteristic.
Once a market learns the true characteristic of a worker, he will not get through the regular screening
process anymore. Instead, he is assigned according to his qualification. We use the poisson process
to represent the random arrival of market learning for a worker’s true characteristic. This additional
development is summarized in Appendix A. The critical difference from the original model is that the
demarcation locus of V˙t = 0 shifts to the right and the equilibrium levels of group reputation, Πh and
Πl, shift up.
Finally, the model can be directly applied to the issue of heterogeneous “tipping points” of white
flight in the US housing market. Card et al. (2007) discuss this issue and conclude that the different
white attitudes toward minority groups, the “racist” preference, explain the different tipping points
across cities in the US. However, they do not explain the origin of the different white attitudes across
cities, and the expected price change in the housing market is not reflected in their examination.
The developed group reputation model provides a different perspective to the issue and suggests an
empirical meaningful research agenda to overcome the limit of the previous tipping point literature.
White residents may use the overall quality of the move-in minority group in their calculation of
the expected housing price in the future, which means that they decide whether to flight out or not
considering the collective reputation of the move-in group. (The different white attitudes mentioned
above may simply reflect the different collective reputation of the move-in minority group.) If we can
collect data on the quality of the move-in group, such as crime rate or educational achievement at each
period of time for each city, we might be able to give an explanation for the heterogeneous tipping
points across cities and periods in the US.
7 Conclusion
This paper developed the dynamic version of statistical discrimination (Coate and Loury 1993). We
have shown the importance of both the historical position and the expectation toward the future for
the determination of the final group reputation, which is the overall qualification ratio of a group in
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the long run. By identifying two stable states of high and low reputations and dynamic paths leading
to them, we have defined an overlap in which both optimistic and pessimistic paths are available to
a group, and determined the conditions under which the low reputation state is a reputation trap, in
which a group cannot move out of the trap unless the market structure is adjusted. We have argued
how a black group in a white-dominant society can be positioned in the reputation trap based on the
initial level of group reputation and the non-existence of the optimistic path at the level.
We have determined that a high reputation state is pareto dominant to the low reputation state
in a simple reputation model. Principals can make bigger profits when a social group is at a higher
reputation state. By distinguishing monopolistic principals from competitive principals, we have
examined the strategy of profit-maximizing monopolistic principals to change the market structure and
help the disadvantaged group escape the reputation trap. We have emphasized that the farsightedness
of principals and the credibility of their actions are pre-conditions for the effective implementation of
the strategy. If those are not fulfilled or the coordination cost across employers is very high, the plight
of a disadvantaged group will persist and the government intervention is necessary for the achievement
of the egalitarian society. The policies may include colorblind hiring enforcement, quota system and
asymmetric training subsidy. The examination of those policies in the given dynamic framework are
left for the further research.
This dynamic reputation model is unique for explaining the collective reputation and the corre-
sponding collective action to change the reputation. The model can be adjusted to examine other sub-
jects concerned with collective reputation. Racial reputation for crime can be examined as O’Flaherty
and Sethi (2004) do in a static model. Racial reputation for crime affects the reaction of victims and,
in turn, affects the behavior of criminals. Collective action can be discussed for the change of racial
representation for crime. Brand is another topic that involves collective reputation. Enterprises may
be concerned with how to build up a valuable brand that represents heterogeneous products of the
company. Similar work is done in Tirole (1996) in a game-theoretical manner. Institutional reputation
such as college reputation may be an interesting subject of study, because the overall quality of alumni
determines the collective reputation, and the reputation affects the quality of entering students and
their willingness to pay the tuition. By identifying the multiple equilibria and dynamic paths, we can
discuss the strategies for building the reputation of an institution.
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8 Appendix A: Market Learning Process
In the reputation model developed in this paper, we assume that the true characteristics of each
worker is not fully revealed in the market, even after he spends a long time in the workplace. To lose
this assumption, we introduce the “market learning” process, in which the true characteristic of each
worker is revealed and confirmed in the market under the Poisson process with parameter η: in a
unit period, a worker faces average η chances to reveal his true characteristic in the market. Suppose
that, once his true characteristic is revealed, he does not go through the regular screening process
anymore, where signal θ and identity i determine the chances to be assigned to task 1. Instead, after
the revelation, he is always assigned to task one if he is a qualified worker, and to task zero if he is
not.
Note that over T periods of time, the probability that his true characteristic is not revealed is e−ηT ,
and the probability that it is revealed is 1 − e−ηT under the Poisson process of market learning. A
worker with investment cost c invests only when the expected lifetime payoff of investment is greater
than that of non-investment:
Lifetime Payoff =

∫∞
t
[
e−η(τ−t)βq(Πτ ) + (1− e−η(τ−t))w
]
e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ − c, (Investment.)∫∞
t
[
e−η(τ−t)βu(Πτ ) + (1− e−η(τ−t))0
]
e−(δ+λ)(τ−t)dτ. (Non-investment.)
Therefore, a worker with investment cost c invests only when, noting βτ = βq(Πτ )− βu(Πτ ),∫ ∞
t
βτe
−(δ+λ+η)(τ−t)dτ +
ηw
(δ + λ)(δ + λ+ η)
> c.
Using this, we have a normalized lifetime benefits of investment Vt,
Vt = (δ + λ)
∫ ∞
t
βτe
−(δ+λ+η)(τ−t)dτ +
ηw
δ + λ+ η
.
Taking the derivative, we have the evolution of lifetime benefits of investment,
V˙t = (δ + λ+ η)
[
Vt − δ + λ
δ + λ+ η
βt − ηw
δ + λ+ η
]
.
Since Π˙t is the same to the original model, dynamic system with the consideration of market
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learning becomes,
Π˙t = λ[φt −Πt]
V˙t = (δ + λ+ η)
[
Vt − δ + λ
δ + λ+ η
βt − ηw
δ + λ+ η
]
,
with demarcation loci of
Π˙t = 0 Locus : Πt = φt
V˙t = 0 Locus : Vt =
δ + λ
δ + λ+ η
βt +
ηw
δ + λ+ η
.
The dynamic paths with positive η are described in Appendix Figure 1. The revelation of workers’
true characteristics does not make a big difference to the original reputation model. The only difference
is that the demarcation locus of V˙t = 0, denoted by V˜t(Πt), shifts to the right with the market learning
consideration. The more the true characteristic of a worker is likely to be revealed, the more the
demarcation locus shifts to the right: ∂V˜t(Πt)∂η > 0, which implies that two equilibrium levels of group
reputations (Πh,Πl) and their corresponding benefits of investment (Vh, Vl) increase with the higher
degree of market learning.
If you apply this to the simplified model with uniform distributions of fu(θ) and fq(θ), we can
evaluate how overlap changes with the introduction of market learning: ∂pip∂η < 0, which means that
the deterministic range for Qh expands with the higher degree of market learning. (Refer to Appendix
B for the proof.) The change is described in Panel B in the same figure. Therefore, a group is more
likely to converge to the high reputation state Qh when the market learns workers’ true characteristics
faster.4
Note that there exists a degree of market learning η∗ above which the lower reputation state Ql is
not economically stable: Ql is not stable with η >
(δ+λ)((δ+λ)cm−wPq)
w−(δ+λ)cm (= η
∗). (Refer to Appendix B for
the proof.) This implies that all social groups will converge to the high reputation state Qh, regardless
of their initial group reputations, when the degree of market leaning is high enough. Therefore, if
the market can learn the true characteristics of workers very quickly, there will be no group disparity
caused by the difference of initial group reputations or statistical discrimination practice in the market.
4Note that the sign of ∂pio
∂η
is not clear in the simplified reputation model.
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9 Appendix B: Proofs
9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose a starting point a on the Π = Π∗ line nearby the state (v∗,Π∗): a(va,Π∗). The initial state at
a moves counterclockwise according to the direction arrows depicted in Panel A of Appendix Figure
2. Suppose the path starting from a passes across the v = v∗ line at b(v∗,Πb), the Π = Π∗ line at
c(vc,Π∗), the v = v∗ line at d(v∗,Πd) and the Π = Π∗ line at a′(va′ ,Π∗), as described in the same
panel. The first-order differential system in each region is described in Figure 3. In region I, the slope
of the phase path is represented by v˙
Π˙
= (δ+λ)(vt−1)λ(Πh−Πt) . Thus, we can find the relationship between va
and Πb, ∫ v∗
va
dv
(δ + λ)(v − 1) =
∫ Πb
Π∗
ds
λ(Πh −Π) =⇒
(
1− va
1− v∗
) λ
δ+λ
=
Πh −Πb
Πh −Π∗ . (15)
Also, in region II, the slope of the phase path is represented by v˙
Π˙
= (δ+λ)(vt−1)λ(Πl−Πt) . Thus, we can find
the relationship between vc and Πb,
∫ vc
v∗
dv
(δ + λ)(v − 1) =
∫ Π∗
Πb
ds
λ(Πl −Πs) =⇒
(
1− vc
1− v∗
) λ
δ+λ
=
Πb −Πl
Π∗ −Πl . (16)
From (15) and (16), we can derive the relationship between va and vc, taking Πb out. The following
formula summarizes the result, denoting λδ+λ as ρ
′:
(1− va)ρ′(Πh −Π∗) + (1− vc)ρ′(Π∗ −Πl) = (1− v∗)ρ′(Πh −Πl). (17)
Therefore, va is a function of vc in vc ∈ [0, v∗]: va(vc). Note that va(v∗) = v∗. In the same way, out of
regions III and IV, we can derive the relationship between v′a and vc, taking Πd out. In region III, the
slope of the phase path is represented by v˙
Π˙
= (δ+λ)vtλ(Πl−Πt) . Thus, we can find the relationship between
vc and Πd, ∫ v∗
vc
dv
(δ + λ)v
=
∫ Πd
Π∗
dΠ
λ(Πl −Π) =⇒
( vc
v∗
) λ
δ+λ =
Πd −Πl
Π∗ −Πl . (18)
Also, in region IV, the slope of the phase path is represented by v˙
Π˙
= (δ+λ)vtλ(Πh−Πt) . Thus, we can find the
relationship between va′ and Πd,
∫ va′
v∗
dv
(δ + λ)v
=
∫ Π∗
Πd
dΠ
λ(Πh −Π) =⇒
(
v′a
v∗
) λ
δ+λ
=
Πh −Πd
Πh −Π∗ . (19)
From (18) and (19), we have the following formula that indicates the relationship between va′ and vc,
denoting λδ+λ as ρ
′:
vρa′
′(Πh −Π∗) + vρc ′(Π∗ −Πl) = v∗ρ
′
(Πh −Πl). (20)
Therefore, va′ is a function of vc in vc ∈ [0, v∗]: va′(vc). Note that va′(v∗) = v∗.
To prove Lemma 1, we need the following two conditions to be satisfied, as depicted in Panel B of
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Appendix Figure 2:
- Condition 1: Two curves va(vc) and va′(vc) are tangent at (v∗, v∗): dvadvc
∣∣
(v∗,v∗) =
dva′
dvc
∣∣
(v∗,v∗)
- Condition 2: va(vc) is concave and va′(vc) is convex in [0, v∗]: d
2va
dv2c
< 0 and d
2va′
dv2c
> 0, ∀vc ∈ [0, v∗].
Proof of Condition 1. From equation (17), let us define the function F, F = (1− va)ρ′(Πh −Π∗) +
(1− vc)ρ′(Π∗ −Πl)− (1− v∗)ρ′(Πh −Πl) = 0. By the implicit function theorem, Fvadva + Fvcdvc = 0.
Therefore, we have
dva
dvc
= − (1− vc)
ρ′−1
(1− va)ρ′−1 ·
Π∗ −Πl
Πh −Π∗ . (21)
This gives the slope of the curve va(vc) at (v∗, v∗): dvadvc
∣∣∣
(v∗,v∗)
= − Π∗−ΠlΠh−Π∗ . From equation (20), let us
define the function G, G = vρa′
′(Πh−Π∗) + vρc ′(Π∗−Πl)− v∗ρ′(Πh−Πl) = 0. By the implicit function
theorem, Gva′dva′ +Gvcdvc = 0. Therefore, we have
dva′
dvc
= −v
ρ′−1
c
vρ
′−1
a′
· Π
∗ −Πl
Πh −Π∗ . (22)
This gives the slope of the curve va′(vc) at (v∗, v∗):
dva′
dvc
∣∣∣
(v∗,v∗)
= − Π∗−ΠlΠh−Π∗ . Therefore, condition 1 is
satisfied.
Proof of Condition 2. From equations (17) and (21), dvadvc can be expressed in terms of vc,
dva
dvc
= − (1− vc)
ρ′−1
[−(1− vc)ρ′(Π∗ −Πl) + (1− v∗)ρ′(Πh −Πl)]
ρ′−1
ρ′
· Π
∗ −Πl
(Πh −Π∗)
1
ρ′
.
Taking the second derivative with respect to vc, the following result follows: d
2va
dv2c
< 0 as far as δ > 0.
From (20) and (22), dva′dvc can be expressed in terms of vc,
dva′
dvc
= − v
ρ′−1
c
[−vρc ′(Π∗ −Πl) + v∗ρ′(Πh −Πl)]
ρ′−1
ρ′
· Π
∗ −Πl
(Πh −Π∗)
1
ρ′
.
Taking the second derivative with respect to vc, the following result follows:
d2va′
dv2c
> 0 as far as δ > 0.
Therefore, condition 2 is satisfied.
The results imply that when starting in a neighborhood around (s∗, v∗), the equilibrium path
spirals out. Therefore, the state (s∗, v∗) is unstable because any tiny perturbation to the state will
make the state (st, vt) move away from it. (However, note that d
2va
dv2c
= d
2va′
dv2c
= 0 if δ = 0. This implies
that the equilibrium paths are cyclical, like a vortex, if the time discount rate(δ) is zero.) QED.
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9.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The slope of the equilibrium path in region IV is Π˙v˙
∣∣
IV
= λ(Πh−Πt)(δ+λ)vt . The first derivative of the slope is
d
dvt
[
Π˙
v˙
∣∣∣
IV
]
= −λ(Πh −Πt)
(δ + λ)v2t
− λΠh
(δ + λ)vt
· dΠt
dvt
< 0.
Therefore, in region IV, the equilibrium paths are concave.
The slope of the equilibrium path in region I is Π˙v˙
∣∣
IV
= λ(Πh−Πt)(δ+λ)(vt−1) . The first derivative of the
slope is
d
dvt
[
Π˙
v˙
∣∣∣
I
]
= − λ(Πh −Πt)
(δ + λ)(vt − 1)2 −
λΠh
(δ + λ)(vt − 1) ·
dΠt
dvt
< 0.
Therefore, in region I, the equilibrium paths are concave. In sum, at the righthand side of the vt = v∗
line, equilibrium paths are concave. In the same way, we can prove that equilibrium paths are convex
at the lefthand side of the vt = v∗ line. QED.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First, let us check expected benefits at Qh and Ql for workers with different investment cost levels:
1. Agents with Low Investment Cost
They invest at either Qh or Ql. At Qh, the size of normalized lifetime benefits is ω. At Ql, it is
ωPq.
2. Agents with High Investment Cost
They do not invest at either Qh or Ql. At Qh, the size of normalized lifetime benefits is ω(1−Pu).
At Ql, it is zero.
3. Agents with Medium Level of Investment Cost
They invest at Qh, but do not invest at Ql. At Qh, the size of normalized lifetime benefits is
ω − (δ + λ)cm, which is positive in the given dynamic structure. At Ql, it is zero.
Second, let us check the profits of principals:
1. Profits at Qh: Principals give the benefit of doubt to agents with unclear signals. Thus, at point
of time τ , the expected profits from the workers with low investment cost is Πlxq, the expected
profit from the workers with high investment cost is (1 − Πh)(1 − Pu)(−xu), and the expected
profit from the medium cost workers is (Πh − Πl)xq because they invest at Qh. Therefore, the
total profit at time τ is Yτ (Qh) = −(1−Πh)(1− Pu)xu +Πhxq.
2. Profits at Ql: Principals do not give the benefit of doubt. Thus, at point of time τ , the expected
profit from the workers with low investment cost is ΠlPqxq, the expected profit from the workers
with high investment cost or medium investment cost is zero, because they do not invest and
principals do not give BOD. Therefore, the total profit at time τ is Yτ (Ql) = ΠlPqxq.
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The given condition Πl < Π∗ < Πh implies that Yτ (Qh) > Yτ (Ql). Thus, all workers with different
investment cost and principals are better off at Qh than at Ql. QED.
9.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Given the dynamic system in equations (1), its linearization around a steady state (v¯, Π¯) is
V˙t = (δ + λ)(V¯ − βt(Π¯))− (δ + λ)β′t(Π¯)(Πt − Π¯) + (δ + λ)(Vt − V¯ )
Π˙t = λ(φt(V¯ )− Π¯)− λ(Πt − Π¯) + λφ′t(V¯ )(Vt − V¯ ).
Since (V¯ , Π¯) is a steady state, it is
V˙t = (δ + λ)Vt − (δ + λ)β′t(Π¯)Πt + (δ + λ)[−V¯ + β′t(Π¯)Π¯]
Π˙t = λφ′t(V¯ )Vt − λΠt + λ[−φ′t(V¯ )V¯ + Π¯].
Therefore, the Jacobian matrix JE evaluated at a steady state is
JE ≡
[
δ + λ −(δ + λ)β′t
λφ′t −λ
]
(V¯ ,Π¯)
.
Consequently, its transpose is trJE = δ and the determinant is |JE | = λ(δ + λ)[β′tφ′t − 1]. Since trJE
is positive, every steady state is unstable. Note that |JE | is negative if and only if ∂βt∂Πt <
(
∂φt
∂Vt
)−1
at
(V¯ , Π¯). This is true for the two steady states Qh and Ql as easily confirmed in Panel B of Figure 5.
Therefore, the characteristic roots for Qh and Ql are one positive and one negative. Therefore, those
are saddle points. In the same way, we can confirm that |JE | is positive at Qm, which means two
positive characteristics. Therefore, Qm is a source, either unstable node or unstable focus. QED.
9.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Note that the characteristic roots are, based on the proof of Lemma 4,
r1, r2 =
δ ±√δ2 − 4λ(δ + λ)[β′tφ′t − 1]
2
.
Since we already shown that Qm is a source in the same lemma, if both r1 and r2 are imaginary
numbers, then the trajectories around Qm spiral out. Therefore, if δ2 − 4λ(δ + λ)[β′tφ′t − 1](≡ D) is
negative, they spiral out. The condition is summarized as follows:
D < 0 ⇐⇒
(
1 +
λ
δ
)
λ
δ
>
1
4(φ′tβ′t − 1)
∣∣∣
(Vm,Πm)
.
QED.
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9.6 Proof of Appendix A
First, we prove that ∂pip∂η < 0. If we transpose the dynamic system with Vt =
δ+λ
δ+λ+ηωPq +
ηw
δ+λ+η +
δ+λ
δ+λ+ηω(Pu−Pq)vt, we can use the following result in section 3.3.2 directly from the simple reputation
model developed in this paper: pip = Πl+(Π∗−Πl)(1−v∗′)−
λ
δ+λ+η , where v∗′ = (δ+λ+η)(δ+λ)cm−(δ+λ)ωPq−ηω(δ+λ)(ωPu−ωPq) .
(Note that the differential equations with the transpose are identical to those in Figure 3, except using
(δ + λ+ η) instead of using (δ + λ).) The partial derivative with respect to η gives ∂pip∂η < 0.
Secondly, we prove that there exists η∗ above which Ql is not economically stable, where η∗ =
(δ+λ)((δ+λ)cm−wPq)
w−(δ+λ)cm . You can check that the demarcation locus of V˙t = 0 below Π
∗, which is δ+λδ+λ+ηωPq+
ηω
δ+λ+η , becomes greater than (δ+λ)cm, when η > η
∗. The other way is to check the sign of v∗′: when
v∗′ is negative, Ql cannot be stable, as the dynamic system of the simple reputation model in Figures
4 and 5 implies. QED.
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